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Abstract
We study a new QKD that is different from the scheme proposed by [10], though it essentially takes
our ground on three-player quantum games and Greenberg-Horne-Zeilinger triplet entangled state (GHZ
state) [16] is used. In the scheme proposed in this paper, players in the game, Bob and Charlie (and Alice
also) can get some common key or information (applied strategies and their payoffs in the game), when
Alice informs Bob and Charlie about some results of the measurement made by her. Even if somebody
else knows the public information, he/she can not get any key information. There is not any arbiter in our
scheme, since existence of an arbiter increases the risk of wiretapping. Lastly we discuss robustness of the
proposed QKD method for eavesdrop. We show that though maximally entangled case and non-entangled
case essentially provide an equivalent way as QKD, the latter is not available in the case where there are
some eavesdroppers. At the same time, we point put that the entanglement of the initial state is crucial
when a partially entangled state is used.
keywords: Three-Player Quantum Game, Quantum Key Distribution, Payoff, Entangled State, Eavesdrop
1 Introduction
Quantum version of information science has opened the doors of new and large possibility of computer
science[1]. Quantum game[2] is an interesting subject and remains in the realm of the unknown in potential
capacities. Two schemes for quantum games mainly have been proposed so far. One has been proposed by Eisert
et al. [3] where the strategy space of players is a two parameter set of 2 × 2 matrices and Prisoners Dilemma
was discussed. It is shown that starting with maximally entangled initial state, the dilemma disappears for
a suitable quantum strategy. Moreover they pointed out that a quantum strategy displays its superiority to
all the classical strategies. The details of this scheme were also reviewed by Rosero [4]. Another one has been
introduced by Marinatto and Weber [5] applying it to the game of Battle of Sexes. In their scheme, starting with
maximally entangled initial state, the players are allowed to apply the probabilistic tactics of unitary operators.
As result, they found the strategy for which both the players can get equal payoffs. Recently two schemes could
be studied by a unified way[8]. Two schemes are one aspect of the generalized quantization scheme developed
by Nazawa and Toor[8]. Furthermore, the scheme was extended to three-player quantum games by Ramzan
and Khan[9].
Quantum game theory is not only a tool to resolve a dilemma in some games and find better payoffs than
ones of classical strategies, but also it has more potential ability and will provide wide types of communication
protocols. For further details, you can consult the article given by Iqbal[6]. In fact Ramzan and Khan studied
an interesting aspects of communication based on three-player quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma[9]. Moreover
the authors investigated a cryptographic protocol based on a scheme of the generalized three-player quantum
game[10].
In classical cryptography in 20-th century, key distribution that generates a private key in a secure way
between two or several remote parties is an important subject. In public key crypto-systems such as Rivest-
Shamir-Adelman(RSA)[11], the receiver generates a pair of keys; a public key and a private key. The security
of the communication relies on the difficulty to factorize a large integer into some prime numbers. The public
key is used to encrypt the message by a sender, while the private one is used for a receiver to decrypt it. But
it has been proved that quantum algorithm can solve the factorization problem in polynomial time[12]. On
the other hand, quantum information theory itself provides some ways of quantum key distribution (QKD).
First protocol was proposed by Bennet and Brassard[13]. After that Eckert proposed a different approach to
QKD[14]. Many protocols are developed as of today[15].
Inspired by a series of researches, we propose a new kind of communication scheme based on three-player
quantum game in this paper. We mainly study QKD that is different from the scheme proposed [10], though it
essentially takes our ground on three-player quantum games and Greenberg-Horne-Zeilinger triplet entangled
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state (GHZ state) [16] is used. In the scheme of [10], Alice finds messages sent from Bob and Charlie by making
a measurement of the qubits that are manipulated by their unitary operators. In our scheme proposed in this
paper, Bob and Charlie (and Alice also) get some common key or information by knowing the some information
of the measurement made by Alice. In [9] where the quantum version of Prisoner’s Dilemma game is adopted,
Bob and Charlie can extract information about the strategy applied by Alice from their payoffs by mutual
understanding that they will apply the same strategy. This protocol stands as an information communication
rather than QKD because this assumes the mutual understanding. The information about payoffs in [9] is
brought by an arbiter. On the contrary there are not any arbiters in our scheme. Existence of an arbiter
increase the risk of wiretapping, because when an arbiter sends classical information, but not quantum state,
to Bob and Charlie, it is difficult to detect wiretapping. As it is better that there are not any arbiters in a
protocol in view of wiretapping, an arbiter is excluded in our scheme. In the proposed protocol here, a scheme
that Bob and Charlie (and Alice) can get some information (key) by results obtained from Alice’s experiment
and it can be made in the secrecy from other people. Thus it provides a sort of QKD. In fact Bob and Charlie
(and Alice) can extract other people’s full information (applied strategies and their payoffs) theoretically by
the information shown by Alice. We show that methods using an entangled state and a non-entangled state
essentially equivalent as QKD but a method using partially entangled state give a different one from the formers
in the protocol.
Lastly we discuss robustness for eavesdrop. We show that though maximally entangled case and non-
entangled case provide an essentially equivalent way as QKD, the latter is not available in the case there are
any eavesdroppers.
2 Framework of Quantum Game
The protocol proposed in this paper is based on three-player quantum games. Three players are Alice , Bob
and Charlie following custom in this field. As result of the game, three player find other players’ strategies and
payoffs after Alice revealed some information to Bob and Charlie about the result of the quantum game. First
of all we describe the framework of quantum games.
Basically we follow the generalized formalism of quantum games proposed by Nawaz and Toor [8] and its
extension given by Ramzan and Khan [9]. In scheme of this paper, Alice, Bob and Charlie can choose one
among two strategies F and T, respectively. We express the strategies F as 0 and T as 1, respectively and a set
of strategies of three players as (0,0,1) for example. The set of strategies (0,0,1) denotes that Alice applies the
strategy F, Bob does F and Charlie does T.
First Alice prepares an initial quantum state that consists of three qubits and passes second qubit and third
one to Bob and Charlie, respectively. Bob and Charlie accept one qubit, respectively and Alice keeps remaining
one qubit that is first qubit. We suppose the initial quantum state shared among three players is the generalized
GHZ state;
|ψin >= cos γ
2
|000 > +i sin γ
2
|111 >, (1)
where 0 ≥ γ ≥ pi/2. There is no entanglement for γ = 0 and the case of γ = pi/2 denotes maximally entangled
state that has the largest von Neumann entropy.
Next the players locally manipulate their individual qubits by some unitary operators; Alice, Bob and Charlie
make the unitary transformations on the first qubit, the second qubit and third qubit, respectively. The classical
strategies F and T are assigned to the two basis vectors |0 > and |1 > in the Hilbert space, respectively. The
strategies of the players are represented by the unitary operator Uk defined by [8]
Uk = cos
θk
2
Rk + sin
θk
2
Qk, (2)
where k = A(Alice), B(Bob) and C(Charlie), and Rk and Qk are unitary operators defined by
Rk|0 >= eiαk |0 >, Rk|1 >= e−iαk |1 >,
Qk|0 >= ei(pi2−βk)|1 >, Qk|1 >= ei(pi2+βk)|0 >, (3)
where 0 ≤ θk ≤ pi, and −pi ≤ αk, βk ≤ pi. After applying the local operators of three players, the density matrix
of the initial state ρin = |ψin >< ψin| changes to
ρf = (UA
⊗
UB
⊗
UC)ρin(UA
⊗
UB
⊗
UC)
†. (4)
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After that, Bob and Charlie return their qubits to Alice and so Alice gets ρf . To determine the payoffs for
three players, we introduce the following payoff operator as a measurement operator;
$(k) = $
(k)
000P000 + $
(k)
001P001 + $
(k)
010P010 + $
(k)
100P100 + $
(k)
011P011 + $
(k)
110P110 + $
(k)
101P101 + $
(k)
111P111, (5)
where
P000 = |ψ000 >< ψ000|, |ψ000 >= cos δ
2
|000 > +i sin δ
2
|111 >,
P111 = |ψ111 >< ψ111|, |ψ111 >= cos δ
2
|111 > +i sin δ
2
|000 >,
P001 = |ψ001 >< ψ001|, |ψ001 >= cos δ
2
|001 > +i sin δ
2
|110 >,
P110 = |ψ110 >< ψ110|, |ψ110 >= cos δ
2
|110 > +i sin δ
2
|001 >,
P010 = |ψ010 >< ψ010|, |ψ010 >= cos δ
2
|010 > −i sin δ
2
|101 >,
P101 = |ψ101 >< ψ101|, |ψ101 >= cos δ
2
|101 > −i sin δ
2
|010 >,
P011 = |ψ011 >< ψ011|, |ψ011 >= cos δ
2
|011 > −i sin δ
2
|100 >,
P100 = |ψ100 >< ψ100|, |ψ100 >= cos δ
2
|100 > −i sin δ
2
|011 > (6)
with 0 ≤ δ ≤ pi/2 and $(k)abc are the elements of the payoff matrix given in table 1. δ denotes the degree of
entanglement in the base for measurement (computational) base. In quantum version of usual game theories, a
payoff is really given by an expectation value. In this scheme, Alice takes the final projective measurement (von
Neumann measurement) in the computational basis given by Eq.(6). The expected payoffs for three players are
obtained as the mean values of the payoff operators;
P k(θk, αk, βk, δ, γ) = Tr($
(k)
abcρf ), (7)
where a, b, c ∈ {0, 1} that mean strategies of three players and Tr is taken for above |ψabc > basis. By using
equations (1)∼(7), the expected payoffs for three players are given by
P k(θk, αk, βk, δ, γ) = CACBCC
(
η1$
(k)
000 + η2$
(k)
111 + ξ($
(k)
000 − $(k)111) cos 2(αA + αB + αC)
)
+ SASBSC
(
η2$
(k)
000 + η1$
(k)
111 − ξ($(k)000 − $(k)111) cos 2(βA + βB + βC)
)
+ CACBSC
(
η1$
(k)
001 + η2$
(k)
110 + ξ($
(k)
001 − $(k)110) cos 2(αA + αB − βC)
)
+ SASBCC
(
η2$
(k)
001 + η1$
(k)
110 − ξ($(k)001 − $(k)110) cos 2(βA + βB − αC)
)
+ SACBCC
(
η1$
(k)
100 + η2$
(k)
011 − ξ($(k)100 − $(k)011) cos 2(−βA + αB + αC)
)
+ CASBSC
(
η2$
(k)
100 + η1$
(k)
011 + ξ($
(k)
100 − $(k)011) cos 2(−αA + βB − βC)
)
+ SACBSC
(
η1$
(k)
101 + η2$
(k)
010 − ξ($(k)101 − $(k)010) cos 2(βA − αB + βC)
)
+ CASBCC
(
η2$
(k)
101 + η1$
(k)
010 + ξ($
(k)
101 − $(k)010) cos 2(αA − βB + αC)
)
+
1
8
sin[θA, θB, θC ]×{
cos δ sin γ cos(αA + αB + αC − βA − βB − βC)
∑
a,b,c∈{0,1}
$abc(−1)(a+b+c)
− cos γ sin δ
(
+
(
$
(k)
000 − $(k)111
)
cos(αA + αB + αC + βA + βB + βC)
+
(
$
(k)
110 − $(k)001
)
cos(αA + αB − αC + βA + βB − βC)
+
(
$
(k)
010 − $(k)101
)
cos(αA − αB + αC + βA − βB + βC)
+
(
$
(k)
100 − $(k)011
)
cos(αA − αB − αC + βA − βB − βC)
)}
, (8)
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where
Ck = cos
2(θk/2), Sk = sin
2(θk/2), and so Ck + Sk = 1 (9)
η1 = cos
2 γ
2
cos2
δ
2
+ sin2
γ
2
sin2
δ
2
, (10)
η2 = sin
2 γ
2
cos2
δ
2
+ cos2
γ
2
sin2
δ
2
, (11)
ξ =
1
2
sin(δ) sin(γ), (12)
sin[θA, θB, θC ] = sin(θA) sin(θB) sin(θC). (13)
This is a function of the entanglement parameters γ and δ, strategy parameters of three players, αk, βk and
θk, and the elements $
(k)
abcof a payoff matrix. New parameters η1, η2 and ξ are essentially entangled parameters,
and θk means the strategy parameter for player k.
Table 1. The payoff matrix for a three-player game where the first number in the parenthesis denotes the
payoff of Alice, the second number denotes the one of Bob and third number denotes one of Charlie.
Charlie F Charlie T  
Bob 
F              T 
Bob 
F           T 
F ($(A)000,$(B)000,$(C)000), ($(A)010, $(B)010,$(C)010) ($(A)001,$(B)001,$(C)001), ($(A)011, $(B)011,$(C)011) 
                                          T ($(A)100,$(B)100,$(C)100), ($(A)110, $(B)110,$(C)110) ($(A)101,$(B)101,$(C)101), ($(A)111, $(B)111,$(C)111) 
 
A
lice 
@
3 Protocol for Key Distribution
The proposed protocol is based on the three player quantum game. Basic idea is that three players can
know the full information of game, other players’ payoffs and strategies applied, when Alice open some classical
information to Bob and Charlie. However, she can not get any useful information from it, even if Eva eavesdrops
on the classical information.
3.1 Basic Protocol of QKD
First of all, we plainly describe the basic protocol proposed in this paper and the further details will be
given the subsequent subsection.
Notice that all players see the expression Eq.(8) for the expected payoff because they can evaluate it from
the setting of the quantum game and it is assumed that Alice, Bob and Charlie see the classical payoff matrix
described in Table 1( or Alice can set up the values in Table 1 to her convenience ). The basic protocol is given
by the following 7 steps.
1. Alice prepares an initial quantum state represented by Eq.(1).
2. Alice sends the second qubit and the third qubit to Bob and Charlie, respectively, but keeps the first qubit
for herself.
3. After Bob and Charlie accept their qubits, they and Alice locally manipulate their individual qubits by
the unitary operator Eq.(2) and Eq.(3), respectively. Three players can choose a favorite parameter set
(strategy) of the unitary operators.
4. After that, Bob and Charlie return their qubits manipulated by their unitary operator to Alice.
5. Alice performs von Neumann measurement of the payoffs based on the measurement basis Eq.(6) and find
the strategies applied by Bob and Charlie from the results ∗.
∗It is a hard physical problem that what kind of physical experiment should be concretely conducted in order to determine a
computational state shrunken at present. It is known that it is difficult that we even discriminate a special one from four 2qubit
Bell states used well in quantum information science[18].Thus it is beyond the limitation of this paper that author presents the
concrete experiment that identifies GHZ with 3qubit.
6. Alice conveys some information relative to the game to Bob and Charlie.
7. By the information, Bob and Charlie can find all information, including opponents’ strategy and payoffs,
of the game.
What information Alice should send is determined on a case-by-case as will be described later on in the
concrete. By the information, Bob and Charlie can find all information, including opponents’ strategy and
payoffs, of the game. Anyway, everyone has common information. If they come to an agreement about the
correspondence between parameters applied in this protocol and some digital information each other in advance,
they can have some common digital information. This is the essential scenario for the key sharing conveyed by
the common information. The outline of this protocol is given in Fig.1.
We show that the scenario is actually available in the following subsections. What information should
Alice open to the public in the scenario? How can Bob and Charlie find others’ information about the game?
We will show them by giving concrete expressions for them. We investigate things dividing into three cases;
non-entangled cases, maximally entangled cases and partially entangled cases. Explicit expressions of various
quantities are, however, too complicate to analysis them. So we impose some symmetries or conditions on each
case in order to simplify things.
Return
qubit
thirdsend qubitqubit
prepares an initial state
INFORM
Bob Charlie
Alice
operation operation
U UB C
apply a unitary
apply a unitary apply a unitary
operation UA
Fig.1 The outline of the protocol@
@
3.2 Non Entanglement Cases
In this subsection we consider the case without any entangled states, both the initial state and the compu-
tational base. We take γ = δ = 0 which leads to η1 = 1 and η2 = ξ = 0, and assume that the phase parameters
αi = βi = 0.
Then we get the following formula for the expectation value of the payoff;
P k(θk, 0, 0, 0, 0) = CACBCC$
(k)
000 + SASBSC$
(k)
111 + CACBSC$
(k)
001 + SASBCC$
(k)
110
+SACBCC$
(k)
100 + CASBSC$
(k)
011 + SACBSC$
(k)
101 + CASBCC$
(k)
010 (14)
= CBCCD
(k)
A + SBCCE
(k)
A + CBSCF
(k)
A + SBSCG
(k)
A for Alice (15)
= CACCD
(k)
B + SACCE
(k)
B + CASCF
(k)
B + SASCG
(k)
B for Bob (16)
= CACBD
(k)
C + SACBE
(k)
C + CASBF
(k)
C + SASBG
(k)
C for Charlie, (17)
where
D
(k)
A = CA$
(k)
000 + SA$
(k)
100 E
(k)
A = CA$
(k)
010 + SA$
(k)
110
F
(k)
A = CA$
(k)
001 + SA$
(k)
101 G
(k)
A = CA$
(k)
011 + SA$
(k)
111 (18)
D
(k)
B = CB$
(k)
000 + SB$
(k)
010 E
(k)
B = CB$
(k)
100 + SB$
(k)
110
5
F
(k)
B = CB$
(k)
001 + SB$
(k)
011 G
(k)
B = CB$
(k)
101 + SB$
(k)
111 (19)
D
(k)
C = CC$
(k)
000 + SC$
(k)
001 E
(k)
C = CC$
(k)
100 + SC$
(k)
101
F
(k)
C = CC$
(k)
010 + SC$
(k)
011 G
(k)
C = CC$
(k)
110 + SC$
(k)
111. (20)
Eq.(14)-(17) are the same equations, but they are available expressions for each player, respectively. X
(k)
k′ ,
where X = D,E, F,G and k′ = A,B and C, have proper information of player k′.
In this stage, we can describe the details of the step 5 in the previous subsection.
5-1 Alice performs a von Neumann measurement of the payoffs for three players by using the measurement
basis Eq.(6), which is a sort of the physical observable. Then the final state shrinks to one of measurement
bases with the possibility following quantum theory. For example, if the state shrinks to ψ000, Alice finds
measurement payoffs PA = CACBCC$
(A)
000 as Alice’s payoff. The measured payoff is represented as PA with
subscript A to mark off from the expected payoff PA.
5-2 Alice measure Bob’s payoff and Charlie’s one in the same manner. They can be simultaneously measured,
because their operators are commutable each other. Then Alice estimates the ratio PA : PB : PC . This
value teaches Alice the shrunken state (ψ000 in the present example). Notice this is possible only when
Alice or a planner of the initial payoff matrix needs to alter the ration of $
(k)
abc at every set of {abc}. Thus
Alice can see to which state the final state shrinks from the ratio, if the ratio of the payoffs $
(A)
abc : $
(B)
abc : $
(C)
abc
is different each other for distinct a, b, c.
5-3 Alice can find strategies adopted by Bob and Charlie (of course her strategy CA), as Alice knows to
which state the measured state shrunk. For the example of 5.1, Alice see CBCC
†. By using these values,
Alice calculate the expected payoffs for three players and informs some information relative to game. As
mentioned later, there is a case that all goes well only by getting the product value CBCC .
It is assumed that all players see the classical payoff values described in Table 1 or Alice informs the classical
payoff values set up in Table I by her to Bob and Charlie. What even more information should Alice convey
for Bob and Charlie to get information about opponents’ payoffs and strategies? Notice that three players see
the expression Eq. (8) of the expected payoffs. For Bob, unknown data are PA, PB, PC , CA and CC which
are strategies of Alice and Charlie (notice that αk = βk = 0 and of course Bob knows his strategy CB). Taking
account of k = A,B,C, Bob has three payoff equations given by Eq.(16) for k = A,B,C. So Alice needs to
open two data among them to the public. Thus Bob can evaluate other unknown data in principle. It, however,
is too intricate to get explicit expressions. Imposing some conditions or symmetries will make the expressions
simpler but non-trivial.
Due to the aim, Eq. (15)-(17) is rewritten as followings;
P k(θk, 0, 0, 0, 0) = CBCC(D
(k)
A − E(k)A − F (k)A +G(k)A ) + CB(F (k)A −G(k)A )
+CC(E
(k)
A −G(k)A ) +G(k)A for Alice (21)
= CACC(D
(k)
B − E(k)B − F (k)B +G(k)B ) + CA(F (k)B −G(k)B )
+CC(E
(k)
B −G(k)B ) +G(k)B for Bob (22)
= CACB(D
(k)
C − E(k)C − F (k)C +G(k)C ) + CA(F (k)C −G(k)C )
+CB(E
(k)
C −G(k)C ) +G(k)C for Charlie (23)
It is natural to classify into the following three cases to simplify the things from Eq.(21)-(23);
Case I: (F
(k)
A −G(k)A =)F (k)B −G(k)B = F (k)C −G(k)C = 0
$
(k)
001 = $
(k)
101, $
(k)
011 = $
(k)
111 and $
(k)
010 = $
(k)
110,
($
(k)
001 = $
(k)
101 = $
(k)
011 = $
(k)
111 and $
(k)
010 = $
(k)
110), (24)
Case II: (E
(k)
A −G(k)A =)E(k)B −G(k)B = E(k)C −G(k)C = 0
†If Alice wants to know θB and θC , independently, all players have only to play once again with the same strategies as ones
in the first round. The same value will be unluckily observed with the probability of 1/8. Then one more round is needed but
repeating rounds drastically (exponentially) reduces such unlucky observation.
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$
(k)
100 = $
(k)
101 = $
(k)
110 = $
(k)
111,
($
(k)
100 = $
(k)
101 = $
(k)
110 = $
(k)
111 and $
(k)
010 = $
(k)
011), (25)
Case III: Case (I)
∧
Case (II)
$
(k)
001 = $
(k)
101 = $
(k)
010 = $
(k)
100 = $
(k)
110 = $
(k)
111 = $
(k)
011,
(The same relations hold ) (26)
where the equations within the parentheses denote the cases that the conditions are also imposed on Alice.
Alice is a special person in the sense that she puts together everyone’s states, observe the payoffs by making
a measurement and so can see all P k and Pk, and announce them. Thus Alice has fully information about
this quantum game in the end. In above three cases, we can not take k = A,B,C but should take two among
A,B,C as k, because we need to satisfy the condition that the ratio of the payoffs $
(A)
abc : $
(B)
abc : $
(C)
abc is different
each other for distinct a, b, c when k = A,B,C. as mentioned in the step 5.2.
In the case I without F
(k)
A −G(k)A = 0, we obtain
CA =
(PB −G(B)B )(E(A)B −G(A)B )− (PA −G(A)B )(E(B)B −G(B)B )
(PA −G(A)B )(D(B)B − E(B)B )− (PB −G(B)B )(D(A)B − E(A)B )
,
CC =
PA −G(A)B
CA(D
(A)
B − E(A)B ) + E(A)B −G(A)B
, for Bob (27)
CA =
(PB −G(B)C )(E(A)C −G(A)C )− (PA −G(A)C )(E(B)C −G(B)C )
(PA −G(A)C )(D(B)C − E(B)C )− (PB −G(B)C )(D(A)C − E(A)C )
,
CB =
PA −G(A)C
CA(D
(A)
C − E(A)C ) + E(A)C −G(A)C
, for Charlie. (28)
Notice that E
(k)
A = $
(k)
111, F
(k)
A = G
(k)
A = $
(k)
001 in this case. These quantities are trivial in the sense that they
do not depend on Alice’s strategy and only depend on the payoff matrix originally opened to the public. Xk
k¯′
where k¯′ = B,C, however, is nontrivial and depends on both payoff matrix and their respective strategy. Thus
this condition does not make above expressions trivial.
When k takes A and B in the Case I, from Eq.(27) and (28), we see that when Alice opens PA and PB to
the public, Bob and Charlie can find CA. As result, they can get the information about opponent’s strategy, CC
for Bob and CB for Charlie. So Bob and Charlie can find the strategies of all players and evaluate P
k. Three
players come to acquire full information of the quantum game, P k and Ck, since Alice originally observes all
states and payoffs.
When Alice informs Bob of PA and his expected payoff PB, and Charlie of PA and his expected payoff PC ,
they can also get full information according to the equations derived from Eq.(22) and (23) for Charlie. This
case, however, can not be impossible, because Alice needs k to be A, B and C in the condition of the Case I,
which was not allowed.
There is another case to be considered. Alice opens all of her information, PA and CA. Then Bob and
Charlie can easily evaluate the strategies of their opponent from Eq.(27) and (28). So they can also know full
information of this game by similar logic to the former case. Everything also does not change in the case I
including F
(k)
A −G(k)A = 0.
The case II without E
(k)
A −G(k)A = 0, we obtain
CC =
(PB −G(B)B )(F (A)B −G(A)B )− (PA −G(A)B )(F (B)B −G(B)B )
(PA −G(A)B )(D(B)B − F (B)B )− (PB −G(B)B )(D(A)B − F (A)B )
,
CA =
PA −G(A)B
CC(D
(A)
B − F (A)B ) + F (A)B −G(A)B
, for Bob (29)
CB =
(PB −G(B)C )(F (A)C −G(A)C )− (PA −G(A)C )(F (B)C −G(B)C )
(PA −G(A)C )(D(B)C − F (B)C )− (PB −G(B)C )(D(A)C − F (A)C )
,
CA =
PA −G(A)C
CB(D
(A)
C − F (A)C ) + F (A)C −G(A)C
, for Charlie. (30)
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Notice that E
(k)
k¯′
= G
(k)
k¯′
= $
(k)
100 in this case. When including E
(k)
A −G(k)A = 0, one more equation F (k)C = $(k)010
is added to the relations. These quantities are trivial in the sense that they do not depend on three players’
strategies and only depend on the payoff matrix originally opened to the public. Only F
(k)
B and D
(k)
k′ , however,
are nontrivial and depend on both payoff matrix and their respective strategy. Thus this does not make above
expressions trivial.
Then we see that when Alice open PA and PB to the public, Bob and Charlie can find CA. As result, they
can get the information about the opponent’s strategy, CC for Bob and CB for Charlie. So Bob and Charlie
can find the strategies of all players and evaluate PC . Three players come to acquire full information of the
quantum game, P k and Ck.
It is also impossible that Alice informs Bob of PA and his payoff PB, and Charlie of PA and his payoff PC ,
because of the same reason as in the Case I,
There is another case to be considered. Alice opens all of her information, PA and CA. Then Bob and
Charlie can easily evaluate the strategy of their opponent from the following Eq.(31) and (32).
CC =
PA −G(A)B − CA(F (A)C −G(A)C )
(CA(D
(A)
B − F (A)B )
, for Bob (31)
CB =
PA −G(A)C − CA(F (A)C −G(A)C )
CA(D
(A)
C − F (A)C )
, for Charlie. (32)
They can also know full information of this game by similar logic to the former case.
Everything becomes simpler in the case III. From Eq. (21)-(23), we obtain
P k = CACC(D
(k)
B − F (k)B ) +G(k)B ,
CC =
PA −G(A)B
CA(D
(A)
B − F (A)B )
, for Bob. (33)
P k = CBCC(D
(k)
C − F (k)C ) +G(k)C ,
CB =
PA −G(A)C
CA(D
(A)
C − F (A)C )
, for Charlie. (34)
(35)
Then E
(k)
k′ = G
(k)
k′ = F
(k)
k′ = $100. When Alice opens P
A and CA to the public, all players know full information
of this game for the same logic as before.
If the further condition D
(k)
k¯′
= F
(k)
k¯′
and E
(k)
k¯′
= G
(k)
k¯′
adding to Case III is imposed, we have only a trivial
result. Then we notice that $
(k)
000 = $
(k)
001 and $
(k)
010 = $
(k)
110, $
(k)
100 = $
(k)
101 and $
(k)
111 = $
(k)
110 from D
(k)
B = F
(k)
B
and E
(k)
B = G
(k)
B . Moreover we notice that $
(k)
000 = $
(k)
011 and $
(k)
011 = $
(k)
001, $
(k)
111 = $
(k)
101 and $
(k)
100 = $
(k)
110 from
D
(k)
C = F
(k)
C and E
(k)
C = G
(k)
C . So $
(k)
0ab take all the same value and $
(k)
1ab take so. After all, D
(k)
k¯′
= F
(k)
k¯′
= $
(k)
000,
E
(k)
C = G
(k)
C = $
(k)
100 and E
(k)
B = G
(k)
B = $
(k)
110. Thus all X
(k)
k′ s’ are trivial and have no private information for Bob
and Charlie.
3.3 Maximally Entanglement Cases
We consider the maximally entangled cases in the initial state and the computational base where γ = δ =
pi/2. Then we see that ξ = η1 = η2 = 1/2 and the last term in Eq.(8) that the coefficient of the term is
1
8 sin[θA, θB, θC ] vanishes. When θB = θC = 0, we obtain the trivial expected payoff;
P k = CA$
(k)
000 ± SA$(k)001. (36)
So all people including eavesdropper Eva can obtain full information of this game as soon as Alice opens
something of (classical) information of this game to the public. If Alice privately conveys it to Bob and Charlie,
Eva can obtain full information by eavesdrops. Since the information is a classical type (note the information
such as P k and Ck is classical), it is difficult to detect the eavesdrops.
We take βk = αk = 0 for simplicity but θAθBθC 6= 0. Then we obtain the following equations for the
expectation value of the expected payoff;
P k(θk, 0, 0, pi/2, pi/2) = CACBCC$
(k)
000 + SASBSC$
(k)
111 + CACBSC$
(k)
001 + SASBCC$
(k)
110
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+SACBCC$
(k)
011 + CASBSC$
(k)
100 + SACBSC$
(k)
010 + CASBCC$
(k)
101, (37)
= CBCCD
′(k)
A + SBSCE
′(k)
A + CBSCF
′(k)
A + SBCCG
′(k)
A , for Alice, (38)
= CACCD
′(k)
B + SASCE
′(k)
B + CASCF
′(k)
B + SACCG
′(k)
B , for Bob, (39)
= CACBD
′(k)
C + SASBE
′(k)
C + CASBF
′(k)
C + SACBG
′(k)
C , for Charlie, (40)
where
D
(k)
A = CA$
(k)
000 + SA$
(k)
011, E
(k)
A = CA$
(k)
101 + SA$
(k)
110,
F
(k)
A = CA$
(k)
001 + SA$
(k)
110, G
(k)
A = CA$
(k)
100 + SA$
(k)
111, (41)
D
(k)
B = CB$
(k)
000 + SB$
(k)
101, E
(k)
B = CB$
(k)
011 + SB$
(k)
111,
F
(k)
B = CB$
(k)
001 + SB$
(k)
011, G
(k)
B = CB$
(k)
010 + SB$
(k)
111, (42)
D
(k)
C = CC$
(k)
000 + SC$
(k)
001, E
(k)
C = CC$
(k)
011 + SC$
(k)
010,
F
(k)
C = CC$
(k)
101 + SC$
(k)
100, G
(k)
C = CC$
(k)
110 + SC$
(k)
111. (43)
By comparing these equations to (14)-(20) in the non-entangled case, we find that both expressions are
transferred from one hand to the other by exchanging 100↔ 011 and 010↔ 101. So there is a sort of symmetry
in the both cases;
100←→ 011 and 010←→ 101. (44)
Thus there is no essential difference between maximally entangled case and non-entangled case.
We give a little comment on the cases of αk 6= 0 6= βk. In both non-entangled case and maximally entangle-
ment case, the last term in Eq.(8) vanishes. Then both cases with αk 6= 0 6= βk are linearly transformed each
other in the elements of a payoff matrix such as;
(
$′000
$′111
)
=
(
η1 + ξ cos(αA + αB + αC) η2 − ξ cos(αA + αB + αC)
η2 − ξ cos(βA + βB + βC) η1 + ξ cos(βA + βB + βC)
)(
$000
$111
)
,
(
$′001
$′110
)
=
(
η1 + ξ cos(αA + αB − βC) η2 − ξ cos(αA + αB − βC)
η2 − ξ cos(βA + βB − αC) η1 + ξ cos(βA + βB − αC)
)(
$001
$110
)
,
(
$′100
$′011
)
=
(
η1 − ξ cos(−βA + αB + αC) η2 + ξ cos(−βA + αB + αC)
η2 + ξ cos(αA − βB + βC) η1 − ξ cos(αA − βB + βC)
)(
$100
$011
)
,
(
$′101
$′101
)
=
(
η1 − ξ cos(βA − αB + βC) η2 + ξ cos(βA − αB + βC)
η2 + ξ cos(αA − βB + αC) η1 − ξ cos(αA − βB + αC)
)(
$101
$101
)
. (45)
So in both non-entangled case and maximally entangled case, αk 6= 0 6= βk does not have any crucial influence
on previous results in this paper.
3.4 Partially Entangled Cases
We take αk = 0 = βC , βA − βB = pi and βA + βB = 2pi for simplicity but θAθBθC 6= 0. There are many
equivalent choices of these parameters and the this choice is only one example among them. The following
discussions show that QKD is feasible even in this special case including further condition added later.
Then we obtain the following equations for the last term in Eq.(8);
P k(θk, 0, βk, δ, γ)last =
1
8
sin[θA, θB, θC ]
{
sin
(
δ − γ) ∑
a,b,c∈{0,1}
$
(k)
abc(−1)(a+b+c)
}
. (46)
So we consider the case of δ = 0 and γ = pi/2, or δ = pi/2 and γ = 0 as a partially entangled case. Under
this choice, we obtain
η1 = η2 =
1
2
, ξ = 0, (47)
P k(θk, 0, βk, δ, γ)last = ±
√
CACBCCSASBSC
∑
a,b,c∈{0,1}
$
(k)
abc(−1)(a+b+c), (48)
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where ± corresponds to two choices of δ and γ. From Eq.(48), Eq. (8) is rewritten as follows;
P k(θk, 0, βk, δ, γ) =
1
2
{
$
(k)
000
(
cAcBcC ± sAsBsC
)2
+ $
(k)
111
(
cAcBcC ∓ sAsBsC
)2
+ $
(k)
001
(
cAcBsC ∓ sAsBcC
)2
+ $
(k)
110
(
cAcBsC ± sAsBcC
)2
+ $
(k)
100
(
sAcBcC ∓ cAsBsC
)2
+ $
(k)
011
(
sAcBcC ± cAsBsC
)2
+ $
(k)
101
(
sAcBsC ± cAsBcC
)2
+ $
(k)
010
(
sAcBsC ∓ cAsBcC
)2}
, (49)
where
ck = cos(
θk
2
), and sk = sin(
θk
2
). (50)
When Alice chooses her strategy parameter θA = pi/4, the above formula is transformed to
P k(θk, 0, βk, δ, γ) =
1
4
{
$
(k)
000 cos
2(
θB ∓ θC
2
) + $
(k)
111 cos
2(
θB ± θC
2
)
+ $
(k)
001 sin
2(
θB ∓ θC
2
) + $
(k)
110 sin
2(
θB ± θC
2
)
+ $
(k)
100 cos
2(
θB ± θC
2
) + $
(k)
011 cos
2(
θB ∓ θC
2
)
+ $
(k)
101 sin
2(
θB ± θC
2
) + $
(k)
010 sin
2(
θB ∓ θC
2
). (51)
As pointed out in the subsection 3.2, Alice can find θB and θC by carrying out 1∼5 twice in the subsection
3.1. Thus Alice can evaluate the expected payoffs for all players.
Furthermore we impose a condition on the payoff matrix to make the analysis simpler.
$
(k)
111 = $
(k)
000, $
(k)
001 = $
(k)
110, $
(k)
100 = $
(k)
011, $
(k)
101 = $
(k)
010, (52)
where k=A and C due to the same reason as in the subsection 3.2. This is a sort of duality, since this means
$abc = $a¯b¯c¯ where 0¯ = 1 and 1¯ = 0. We call this duality NOT-duality that also means F ⇐⇒ T symmetry.
Under this NOT-duality, we obtain
P k(θk, 0, βk, δ, γ) =
{
$
(k)
000
(
CACBCC + SASBSC
)
+ $
(k)
001
(
CACBSC + SASBCC
)
+$
(k)
100
(
SACBCC + CASBSC
)
+ $
(k)
101
(
SACBSC + CASBCC
)}
(53)
= CBCC($
(k)
000 + $
(k)
100 − $(k)001 − $(k)101) + CB(F¯ (k)A − G¯(k)A )
+CC(E¯
(k)
A − G¯(k)A ) + G¯(k)A for Alice, (54)
= CACC($
(k)
000 + $
(k)
101 − $(k)001 − $(k)100) + CC(E¯(k)B − G¯(k)B )
+CC(F¯
(k)
B − G¯(k)B ) + G¯(k)B for Bob, (55)
= CACB($
(k)
000 + $
(k)
001 − $(k)101 − $(k)100) + CB(F¯ (k)C − G¯(k)C )
+CA(E¯
(k)
C − G¯(k)C ) + G¯(k)C for Charlie. (56)
Here Bob and Charlie do not necessarily know CA and we introduced the following symbol like the previous
cases;
D¯
(k)
A = CA$
(k)
000 + SA$
(k)
100 E¯
(k)
A = CA$
(k)
101 + SA$
(k)
001,
F¯
(k)
A = CA$
(k)
001 + SA$
(k)
101 G¯
(k)
A = CA$
(k)
100 + SA$
(k)
000, (57)
D¯
(k)
B = CB$
(k)
000 + SB$
(k)
101 E¯
(k)
B = CB$
(k)
100 + SB$
(k)
001,
F¯
(k)
B = CB$
(k)
001 + SB$
(k)
100 G¯
(k)
B = CB$
(k)
101 + SB$
(k)
000, (58)
D¯
(k)
C = CC$
(k)
000 + SC$
(k)
001 E¯
(k)
C = CC$
(k)
101 + SC$
(k)
100,
F¯
(k)
C = CC$
(k)
100 + SC$
(k)
101 G¯
(k)
C = CC$
(k)
001 + SC$
(k)
100. (59)
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The expressions of these equations are changed each others under the following transformations;
Bob⇐⇒ Charlie : 101←→ 001 XB ←→ XC , (60)
Bob⇐⇒ Alice : 100←→ 101 XB ←→ XA, (61)
Alice⇐⇒ Charlie : 100←→ 001 XA ←→ XC . (62)
For example, when Alice opens CA = cos
2(pi/8) (θA = pi/4) and PA to the public, Bob and Charlie can find
the strategies of their opponents, respectively;
CC =
PA − CA(F (A)B −G(A)B ) +G(A)B
CA($000 + $101 − $100 − $001) + (E(A)B −G(A)B )
, for Bob. (63)
CB =
PA − CA(F (A)C −G(A)C ) +G(A)C
CA($000 + $001 − $100 − $101) + (E(A)B −G(A)B )
, for Charlie. (64)
As result, they find full information of this game.
Even if Alice opens the expectation values of PA and PB based on her observation, Bob and Charlie can
also find full information of this game. However, the expressions are too complicate to describe them and such
too complicated results are not so available for realistic QKD. We consider the following symmetric cases for
k = A and B;
(I) E¯
(k)
B = G¯
(k)
B , $
(k)
100 = $
(k)
101 and $
(k)
001 = $
(k)
000, (65)
(II) F¯
(k)
B = G¯
(k)
B , $
(k)
001 = $
(k)
101 and $
(k)
100 = $
(k)
000, (66)
(III) E¯
(k)
B = F¯
(k)
B = G¯
(k)
B , $
(k)
001 = $
(k)
101 = $
(k)
100 = $
(k)
000. (67)
Case (I);
we obtain
CC =
PA − $110 + CB($100 − $001)
(2CB − 1)($100 − $001) , for Bob. (68)
CB =
PA − $110 + CC($100 − $001)
(2CC − 1)($100 − $001) . for Charlie. (69)
As result, Bob and Charlie can find full information of this game when only PA is opened to the public.
Case (II);
we obtain
CC =
PA − $000 − CB($100 − $000)
(2CB − 1)($100 − $000) , for Bob. (70)
CB =
PA − $000 + CC($100 − $001)
(2CC − 1)($100 − $001) . for Charlie. (71)
So essentially this case is as same as the case (I). Knowing PA makes all players find full information of this
game. Thus knowing PA is only needed to hold full information of the game in common in both Case(I) and
(II). That such economical point can be realize is a notable feature in the partially entangled case.
Case (III); we only obtain a trivial result;
P k = Gkk′ = 1. (72)
3.5 More Protocol
We make the QKD protocol described in the subsection 3.1 more definite so as to be consummate one.
The procedure given in the subsection 3.1 has to be repeated many times to distribute a key with a large bit
to all players. First of all, it is imperative that three players ahead recognize the correspondence between the
information of the game and some natural numbers;
C
(r)
k ⇐⇒ m(r)k for 2r-th round,
P k(r) ⇐⇒ n(r)k for 2r-th round, , (73)
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where k is A or B or C, and m
(r)
k and n
(r)
k are some natural numbers, respectively. Thus every player obtains
a common number
m
(1)
B m
(1)
C n
(1)
B n
(1)
C m
(2)
B m
(2)
C n
(2)
B n
(2)
C · · ·m(r)B m(r)C n(r)B n(r)C (74)
as a key information by repeating the procedure given in the subsection 3.1 2r times. We can obtain a key
number with double the length of the round number.
4 Brief Comment of Robustness for Eavesdrop
4.1 Phase Damping Model for Eavesdropper
There may be an eavesdropper, Eva, in a quantum line from Alice to Bob or Charlie. She may perform a
measurement on the qubit that Alice (Bob or Charlie) transmits to Bob or Charlie (Alice). We follow Ramzan
and Khan [10] in the discussion as to security against bugging.
An action of measurement performed by Eva on the qubit can be modeled as the action of phase damping
channel [1]. After measurement by Eva, the quantum state with 1 qubit that Alice transmitted to Bob and
Charlie is transformed into
ρ1 =
2∑
i=0
AiρinA
†
i , (75)
where A0 =
√
p|0 >< 0|, A1 = √p|1 >< 1| and A2 =
√
1− pIˆ with the identity operator Iˆ are the Kraus
operators[1]. These operators are the same as ones in the phase flip channel whose channel flips the state of a
qubit from |0 > to |1 > with probability p[1].
This can be extended to
ρN =
2∑
i=0
Ai1 ⊗Ai2 · · · ⊗AiN ⊗ ρinA†iN ⊗ · · ·A
†
i2
⊗A†i1 (76)
for N qubits, where the Kraus operator is described as Ais for each qubit s, when each qubit is measured. Then
the payoff is given by the following replacement in Eq.(8);
ξ =⇒ ξµp,
(−1)(a+b+c) =⇒ µp(−1)(a+b+c), (77)
where µp = 1− p.
4.2 Non-Entangled and Maximally Entangled Cases
In this subsection we focus our attention to the non-entangled case (γ = δ = ξ = 0) and maximally entangled
case (γ = δ = pi/2 and ξ = 1/2). Then the payoff is obtained for both cases by
P k(θk, αk, βk, γ, δ) = CACBCC
(
η1$
(k)
000 + η2$
(k)
111 + ξµp($
(k)
000 − $(k)111) cos 2(αA + αB + αC)
)
+ SASBSC
(
η2$
(k)
000 + η1$
(k)
111 − ξµp($(k)000 − $(k)111) cos 2(βA + βB + βC)
)
+ CACBSC
(
η1$
(k)
001 + η2$
(k)
110 + ξµp($
(k)
001 − $(k)110) cos 2(αA + αB − βC)
)
+ SASBCC
(
η2$
(k)
001 + η1$
(k)
110 − ξµp($(k)001 − $(k)110) cos 2(βA + βB − αC)
)
+ SACBCC
(
η1$
(k)
100 + η2$
(k)
011 − ξµp($(k)100 − $(k)011) cos 2(−βA + αB + αC)
)
+ CASBSC
(
η2$
(k)
100 + η1$
(k)
011 + ξµp($
(k)
100 − $(k)011) cos 2(−αA + βB − βC)
)
+ SACBSC
(
η1$
(k)
101 + η2$
(k)
010 − ξµp($(k)101 − $(k)010) cos 2(βA − αB + βC)
)
+ CASBCC
(
η2$
(k)
101 + η1$
(k)
010 + ξµp($
(k)
101 − $(k)010) cos 2(αA − βB + αC)
)
. (78)
In such as the previous cases, taking αk = βk = 0, the expected payoffs are obtained for the non-entangled case
and maximally entangled case as the follows;
P k(θk, 0, 0, 0, 0) = CACBCC$
(k)
000 + SASBSC$
(k)
111 + CACBSC$
(k)
001 + SASBCC$
(k)
110 + SACBCC$
(k)
100
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+ CASBSC$
(k)
011 + SACBSC$
(k)
101 + CASBCC$
(k)
010, for non-entangled case, (79)
P k(θk, 0, 0, pi/2, pi/2) =
1
2
[
CACBCC
(
$
(k)
000 + $
(k)
111 + µp($
(k)
000 − $(k)111)
)
+ SASBSC
(
$
(k)
000 + $
(k)
111 − µp($(k)000 − $(k)111)
)
+ CACBSC
(
$
(k)
001 + $
(k)
110 + µp($
(k)
001 − $(k)110)
)
+ SASBCC
(
$
(k)
001 + $
(k)
110 − µp($(k)001 − $(k)110)
)
+ SACBCC
(
$
(k)
100 + $
(k)
011 − µp($(k)100 − $(k)011)
)
+ CASBSC
(
$
(k)
100 + $
(k)
011 + µp($
(k)
100 − $(k)011)
)
+ SACBSC
(
$
(k)
101 + $
(k)
010 − µp($(k)101 − $(k)010)
)
+ CASBCC
(
$
(k)
101 + $
(k)
010 + µp($
(k)
101 − $(k)010)
)]
,
for maximally entangled case. (80)
We observe that µp vanishes from P
k in the non-entangled case. So we can not detect the influence of wiretap-
ping. But P k depends on µp in the maximally entangled case. Thus we can detect a wiretapper by comparing
two payoffs (one has original value and another has a deviate value from it). Notice that when αkβk 6= 0, tuning
the values of αk and βk obscures µp dependence on the payoff. As result, detecting wiretappers is available only
at αk = βk = 0.
Though the maximally entangled case and the non-entangled case provided essentially an equivalent way as
QKD in the previous section, the latter is not available in the case with wiretappers.
4.3 Partially Entangled Cases
In this cases, (i) δ = 0 and γ = pi/2 or (ii) δ = pi/2 and γ = 0. Moreover θAθBθC 6= 0, αk = 0 = βC ,
βA − βB = pi and βA + βB = 2pi are chosen for simplicity like in the subsection 3.4.
Then we obtain the following expressions for the last term in Eq. (8);
P k(θk, 0, βk, γ, δ)last =
1
8
µp sin[θA, θB, θC ]
{
sin
(
δ − γ) ∑
a,b,c∈{0,1}
$
(k)
abc(−1)(a+b+c)
}
, for (δ, γ) = (0, pi/2),
= −1
8
sin[θA, θB, θC ]
{
sin
(
δ − γ) ∑
a,b,c∈{0,1}
$
(k)
abc(−1)(a+b+c)
}
, for (δ, γ) = (pi/2, 0).(81)
So the payoff is obtained by
P k(θk, 0, βk, γ, δ) =
1
2
[
CACBCC
(
$
(k)
000 + $
(k)
111
)
+ SASBSC
(
$
(k)
000 + $
(k)
111
)
+ CACBSC
(
$
(k)
001 + $
(k)
110
)
+ SASBCC
(
$
(k)
001 + $
(k)
110
)
+ SACBCC
(
$
(k)
100 + $
(k)
011
)
+ CASBSC
(
$
(k)
100 + $
(k)
011
)
+ SACBSC
(
$
(k)
101 + $
(k)
010
)
+ CASBCC
(
$
(k)
101 + $
(k)
010
)]
+ Eq.(81). (82)
Thus the payoff depends on µp = 1− p only in the case (i) from Eq. (81) and (82). In principle, we can detect
an eavesdropper, only when the parameters are (i) δ = 0 and γ = pi/2. From 4.2 and 4.3, we find that when
γ = pi/2 where the initial state is an entangled state, we can detect an eavesdropper.
5 Summary and Consideration
In this paper we proposed a new QKD method. This method is different from the scheme proposed by [10],
though it essentially takes our ground on three-player quantum games and GHZ state as an entangled state [16]
is used.
Alice , Bob and Charlie join the game. Alice prepares the initial quantum state, and sends the second qubit
and third qubit to Bob and Charlie, respectively, but keeps the first qubit for herself. After Bob and Charlie
accept their qubits, they locally manipulate their individual qubits by some unitary operator, respectively.
Three players can choose a favorite parameter set of the unitary operators. After that, Bob and Charlie return
their qubit manipulated by their unitary operators to Alice. Alice performs a measure of the total state (3
qubits)to determine the payoffs, and conveys some information drived from von Neumann measurement to Bob
and Charlie or opens to the public. By the information, Bob and Charlie can find opponent’s strategy and
payoff of the game. Thus everyone has common information. There are not any arbiters in our scheme, since
existence of an arbiter increases the risk of wiretapping. For it is difficult to detect wiretapping, when an arbiter
sends classical information.
13
We investigated by dividing our protocol into three cases, non-entangled cases, maximally entangled cases
and partially entangled cases, to analyze it. We found that non-entangled cases and maximally entangled ones
are essentially equivalent, since they are converted by a linear transformation each other. On the contrary, the
partially entangled case has a little particular property and produces a sort of dense coding method.
Lastly we discussed robustness for eavesdrop so that we showed that though maximally entangled case and
non-entangled case provided essentially equivalent way as QKD, the latter is not available in the case there are
eavesdroppers. The effect of eavesdropping disappears from the payoff in the non-entangled case. In partially
entangled case, we find that we can detect an eavesdropper by choosing some suitable parameter for δ and γ,
especially γ = pi/2, in principle. So this case gives a robust protocol. As summary, we showed an entangled
initial state (γ 6= 0) gives robust protocols in the all cases of this paper.
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